The Afghan government had barely released the composition of the High Peace Council before analysts were predicting its failure.

The Council, whose existence was mandated by the National Consultative Peace Jirga held in Kabul in June, has 68 members from widely divergent backgrounds and with radically different opinions on the Taliban. This lack of unanimity will make it almost impossible for them to formulate a unified approach to the insurgency, say experts, and, on the other hand, the Taliban have shown few signs of cooperating in any peace negotiations.

Among the more prominent members of the Council are jihadi leaders such as Burhanuddin Rabbani, Haji Mohammad Mohaqeq, and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, whose anti-Taliban credentials are unquestioned. But the Council also contains former Taliban leaders, government officials, members of the Hezb-e-Islami political faction, which has been linked to the Taliban in some areas. There are eight women on the Council.

The High Peace Council is empowered to reach out to the Taliban and initiate peace talks, with the hope that the Council can convince the Taliban to lay down their weapons and reconcile with the government. The Afghan government has placed a high premium on reconciliation, and has expended significant effort in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table.

But publicly the Taliban have continued to reject the prospect of peace talks, calling President Hamid Karzai a puppet of the United States and branding his government as impotent.

Following the summer Peace Jirga, the Afghan government released dozens of prisoners from jails both inside the country and abroad, and has successfully lobbied for several former Taliban leaders to be removed from the United Nations sanctions list, which restricts their travel and freezes their assets.

However, there has as yet been no noticeable reaction from the Taliban, who have, moreover, taken these concessions as signs that they are gaining ground.

Against this backdrop observers are asking whether there is any hope that the Council can bring peace closer to reality.

Wahid Mojda, a political analyst who worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Taliban regime, is not hopeful that the Council will succeed.

“Many members of this Council were engaged in fighting the Taliban,” he said. “This means the Taliban will not trust them, nor do the Council members have a sincere commitment to negotiations.”

 Rather than a positive step forward, the Peace Council is yet another example of the botched efforts of the Afghan president to talk with the Taliban.

“Karzai’s government does not have a practical approach to peace,” said Mojda. “I do not think this Council has any real agenda for talks with the Taliban. Many members are, in fact, opposed to Karzai, and have been put on the Council as a way to secure more cooperation. Like so many other initiatives of the Afghan government, this Council will be a complete failure.”

Mojda pointed out that the Taliban, for its part, have consistently rejected talks with the Afghan government, and have set forth conditions for any negotiations. Foremost among them is the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country before talks could begin. They have already dismissed the Council as the handiwork of U.S. policy in Afghanistan, which makes any effective outcome unlikely.

The prolongation of the conflict, along with the very public pronouncements of certain U.S. officials predicting the failure of the war effort have given the Taliban added confidence, continued Mojda. They consider themselves the victors in this struggle, and the position of the Afghan president has made them even more hopeful that they will win.

“There is a principle in war that if you intend to negotiate, you must first pound your enemy to the point where he feels compelled to stop fighting,” said Mojda. “But with the Taliban, the West and the Afghan government are always making mistakes. After nine years of war, we see that the U.S. feels defeated by the Taliban. The Afghan president beseeches the Taliban to make peace. The Taliban have a strong motivation to win, they want to establish their own government, and this approach is not convincing them.”

Mahmoud Saikal, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the post-Taliban government, agrees that chances of success for the Council are slim.

“There are 68 members with 68 different opinions,” he said. “Some want to suppress the Taliban; others want to bring them into the government. It will be very difficult to find a consensus.”

In addition to the Peace Council’s efforts towards reconciliation, there is also a major initiative aimed at reintegration. This involves persuading moderate Taliban to lay down their arms and rejoin Afghan society. A great deal of money has been pledged to this effort, but so far it has had disappointing results.

Over the past nine years, the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated steadily, with more and more sections of the country coming under the partial or total control of the Taliban.

In addition, the overall situation is complicated by is the position of Pakistan, which has been a supporter of the Afghan Taliban since the movement’s emergence more than 15 years ago. Pakistan, whose main foreign policy focus is on its fractious relationship with India, sees the famously xenophobic Taliban as a defense against being surrounded by enemies. Karzai’s cozy relationship with Delhi has been making Pakistan nervous for years.

Some analysts see Pakistan as the main culprit in disrupting negotiations with the Taliban. In February of this year, Pakistan’s security forces arrested Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Karachi.

Baradar was widely regarded as the Taliban second-in-command, and had been instrumental in initiating contact with the Afghan government. His arrest put an abrupt end to what tentative overtures had been made. At the time there was widespread speculation that Pakistan had consciously taken steps to scupper any peace talks, and to regain control of the process.

“The Taliban have always been defined as a Pakistan-dependent group,” said political analyst Ahmad Saeedi, who served as a diplomat in Pakistan. “We cannot ignore the role of Pakistan’s intelligence agency and high-ranking army officers in supporting the Taliban. No measures taken by the Taliban can be kept hidden from Pakistan, so I think the Afghan government should first solve its problems with Pakistan. If they do that, there will be no more trouble with the Taliban.”

Inside Afghanistan, civil society groups and women’s rights activists oppose negotiations with the Taliban as a blow to Afghanistan’s fledgling democracy. During their reign, the Taliban instituted harsh restrictions on women, and are seen as implacably opposed to civil rights.

“When the Afghan government contemplates negotiations with the Taliban, it should first take into consideration the rights of the Afghan people and democratic values,” said Ajmal Baluchzada, a leader of the Afghan civil society movement. “No one, not even the president, has the right to forgive criminals. Afghans are the main victims of the Taliban, and they must be involved in any negotiations with them. They should be allowed to play a role and express their opinions; otherwise no negotiations can be justified. They will never lead to peace.”